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PARALLEL TRADE, UNPARALLEL LAWS: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL
PARALLEL TRADE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
Julia A. Moore
I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property rights include patents: legal instruments
by which the inventor of an innovative product is given the exclusive
right to sell that product for a period of twenty years.1 An inventor
can receive a patent for a new product or process that involves an in-
ventive step, if it has utility to some industry.2
As the world economy grows increasingly smaller, the laws of
different nations that govern intellectual property are clashing on a
global scale.3 While a product may be patented and protected in Coun-
try A, Country B may have no such laws governing patent rights. Ac-
cordingly, generic manufacturers in Country B produce the patented
product and sell it at a significantly reduced rate. These conflicts cre-
ate numerous problems between patent holder companies and coun-
tries with weak intellectual property laws and also between those
nations and nations with strong intellectual property laws.'
Recently, conflict over patents has arisen in the pharmaceuti-
cal field. Patents are particularly important in pharmaceutical re-
search because of the high cost of developing medications and the ease
with which generic companies can replicate the chemical compound of
the drug. Once obtained, patents protect the innovator in the market,
and although patents appear anti-competitive and monopolistic, they
actually help the market because the innovator is free to create know-
ing he will be recompensed for his efforts. This security allows inven-
tors to create more drugs without worrying about recouping the
1 Pharmaceuticals can have longer than twenty years of market exclusivity with
laws such as the Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §360cc, the Hatch-Waxman Act, 21
U.S.C. §355 and the FDA's provisions for pediatric testing.
2 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103; TERRENCE PRIME, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 178-89 (2000); Timothy A. Brisson & Victor Gallo, Patent Law Basics, 8 NEV.
LAW. 10 (2000) (outlining intellectual property rights in a helpful chart).
3 Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Innovation:
TRIPS and the Interface Between Competition and Patent Protection in the Phar-
maceutical Industry, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363, 363 (2000).
4 Id.
78 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 6:1
expense of the creation process. Many governments in the developed
world adhere to the principle that "[olnly a strong intellectual property
system can best serve the needs of the people around the world."5
Both the United States and the European Union have strict
patent regimes that protect the patent holder with no compulsory
terms.6 However, not all of the patent policies of the United States and
Europe are the same. One example of the different governments' views
is their approach to parallel importing. Parallel importing, which oc-
curs between two or more nations, played a major role in the recent
WTO discussions on free trade and intellectual property rights.
This note aims to prove that the economic policies of the United
States and Europe with respect to parallel trade predict how they re-
acted to the problem of pharmaceutical parallel trading in the develop-
ing world. Part II will explain the importance of patents in the
pharmaceutical field, Part III will define parallel trade and evaluate
its economic strengths and weaknesses, Parts IV and V will examine
the law surrounding parallel trade in the European Union and the
United States, Part VI will examine parallel trade's role in the World
Trade Organization's Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement and how the United States and the European Union
behaved in that negotiation, and Part VII will conclude.
II. WHY PATENTS ARE IMPORTANT
The patent is essential to pharmaceutical research. Patents en-
courage pioneering drug companies to research and develop more
drugs for the world's diseases.7 A pharmaceutical company will only
research drugs for which they can both obtain a patent and have data
indicating a sizable population of consumers for that drug.'
5 Singham, supra note 3, at 364.
6 See 35 U.S.C. §101-103; PRIME, Note 2, at 181, See generally. Robert Weissman,
A Long Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global
Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available
to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1072 (1996).
7 Non-patent exclusivity can also keep a generic drug off the market, as market
exclusivity law keeps the generic company from using the pioneer's FDA market-
ing application data in its own application until the expiration of the non-patent
exclusivity. Thus instead of generating their own data about the generic drug
(which would be costly), the generic companies wait until the end of the pioneer's
market exclusivity. For more about non-patent exclusivity. See Valerie Junod,
Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United States and European Union Law, 59
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 480 (2004).
8 Diseases that only affect a small population or a poor population are not as prof-
itable as others and therefore might pharmaceutical company's interest. The
United States passed the Orphan Drug Act in 1983, giving the pioneer company
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Creating a new drug is highly expensive. Research-based drug
companies outlay at least $110 million and up to $880 million to create
and test one new drug.9 In the United States, the development and
clinical testing of the drug often takes as long as ten years to com-
plete.1" This only accounts for drugs that germinate past the initial
stages; research and development money also goes towards "dry holes"
potential drugs that are investigated but prove not to be viable medi-
cations. Only one in 4,000 chemical compounds created is ever mar-
keted to the general public. 1 Thus, those drugs must generate enough
money to cover the research and development of the other
pharmaceuticals that never made it to the market and an additional
profit beyond that for the company as an incentive to continue.
Two types of companies manufacture pharmaceuticals: pioneer
producers and the generic producers.12 The pioneering companies re-
search and develop new drugs while the generic companies duplicate
those drugs and sell them at reduced prices after the pioneers' patent
and market exclusivity has ended.13
Without patents and market exclusivity, a generic company
could replicate the approved drug and sell it at a significantly reduced
price in direct competition with the pioneer company. This would pre-
vent the researching company from recouping the money it spent on
development. In such a system, there would be little incentive for
pharmaceutical companies to develop new medications. Pharmaceuti-
cal research in India proves this theory. India provides little to no
pharmaceutical patent protection; accordingly, little to no research
and development in pharmaceuticals occurs in India. 4
Patents may seem like a trade hindrance, but they maintain
the long-term economy by encouraging innovation and the develop-
ment of new products. A patent creates efficiency and promotes the
creation of other drugs, which counteracts the restriction of output re-
quired by exclusive property right.'" While patents appear to be anti-
competitive and yet help the market economy, certain practices involv-
ing patented products are competitive and actually hurt the market
economy. One of these anti-patent behaviors is parallel trade.
seven more years of market exclusivity, and the number of orphan drugs rose dra-
matically, including the anti-AIDS treatment AZT.
9 Junod, supra note 7, at 481.
10 Id.
11 Singham, supra note 3, at 373.
12 Junod, supra note 7, at 479
13 Id. at 479
14 Jean 0. Lajuow & lain Cockburn, Do Patents Matter?: Empirical Evidence After
GATT, 7495 Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res. Working Paper 5, 7 (January 2000).
15 Singham, supra note 3, at 366
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III. WHAT IS PARALLEL TRADE? 16
Parallel trade poses an international problem in the pharma-
ceutical industry. Differences in economic, social, legal or regulatory
regimes of countries create varying prices around the world for the
same drug. This discrepancy often leads to parallel trade. A distribu-
tor in a country with a low price for drug A ships drug A to an unau-
thorized dealer in a country with higher price. The unauthorized
dealer then sells the low priced drugs in the new country, competing
directly with the drug A patent holder or authorized dealer in that
country.' 7 If the country where the pharmaceutical is first patented
has no patent rights, the patent owner has no protection against paral-
lel imports.*8
While such a system seems like it would bolster economic effi-
ciency, the exact opposite occurs. By undercutting pricy and inefficient
producers, the singular nature of the pharmaceutical industry makes
parallel importing a pernicious phenomenon. Four market character-
istics cause parallel trading to reduce economic welfare in the pharma-
ceutical world:
(1) In high-technology industries, particularly those
with a high ratio of sunk joint R&D costs, where par-
allel imports will inhibit the ability of firms to recoup
R&D and other fixed costs and ultimately reduce
their ability to innovate;
(2) In situations where price discrimination (differential
pricing) will enhance welfare by facilitating entry
into new, low-priced markets and thus expanding
output;
(3) In cases where monopsony power by public authori-
ties creates price distortions and drives price down
below average fixed costs; and
(4) In countries where free rider problems exist because
parallel imports can freeze out authorized distribu-
tors through lower prices, thus undercutting infor-
mation and service activities.'
Parallel importing is an anathema to the brand-name pharma-
ceutical company because of these factors. Pharmaceutical firms
charge different prices in different geographic markets. The pharma-
16 In this note, parallel trade/trading and parallel imports/importing are used
interchangeably.
17 Claude E. Barfield and Mark A Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharma-
ceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Pol-
icy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 185 (1999).
18 PRIME, supra note 2, at 13.
19 Barfield, supra note 17, at 187.
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ceutical companies reason that they base their prices on the average
income in the area; however, it leads to gross price differences. 20 For
instance, in 1995, the same amount of the antibiotic Amoxil cost $8 in
Pakistan, $14 in Canada, $36 in the United States, $40 in Indonesia
and $60 in Germany.21 Parallel trading would allow a person in Ger-
many who would ordinarily spend $60 on Amoxcil to buy the $8
Amoxcil from Pakistan, depriving the company of the profit from Ger-
man consumers, which pays for the research and development costs.
This essentially creates generic-like competition before patent protec-
tion and market exclusivity expire. Accordingly, the legislative pur-
pose of patents disappears.
In some countries, such as those with socialized medicine or a
poor population that cannot purchase drugs for themselves, the only
purchaser of drugs is the government. In these cases, the patent
holder only has one customer for its product, and will be forced to
change its price to induce the monopsonic buyer to buy.22 In these
countries, parallel trade could undercut the patent holder even fur-
ther, as the buyer would have more than one supplier from which to
choose.
Drug companies point to parallel trade and compulsory licens-
ing to explain the decline in stock value and profits in recent years.23
Glaxo-Wellcome claims parallel imports cost the company "tens of mil-
lions a year. '24 Without parallel trade, Glaxo-Wellcome predicts its
profits would increase and would have more money for research and
development.25
Advocates of parallel trading assert that it does not differ from
the doctrine of exhaustion of rights. Exhaustion of rights occurs when
the patent holder has sold his product and then cannot prevent it from
entering into a different market because his rights have been ex-
hausted by the selling.2 6 However, parallel trading differs through ge-
ography. Exhaustion of rights only applies to a certain geographic
area. For instance, if a product enters the United States market, it is
exhausted everywhere else in the United States market. Parallel trad-
20 Barfield, supra note 17.
21 Editorial, Blood and Gore: Office of the US Trade Representative Goes Too Far
in Promoting Interests of US Drug Companies Abroad, THE NATION, July 19, 1999,
at 16. [hereinafter Blood and Gore].
22 Id.
23 Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Examining Global Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals in
the Face of Patent Protection Rights: The South African Example, 7 BUFF. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 137, 155 (2001).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 PRiME, supra note 2, at 9.
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ing would be an international exhaustion of rights and would nega-
tively impact the consumer.
Under the current system of intellectual property rights, the
consumer is assured of the quality and safety standards of a drug, as
he is able to identify the producer. 27 Doctors Without Borders notes
that counterfeit and poor quality medicines are only aggravated in ar-
eas with parallel trading. 28 Despite these economic arguments
against parallel trading, Europe has a bifurcated system that allows
parallel importing in some parts of the market, but not in others.
IV. PARALLEL TRADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Due to the nature of the European Union, parallel importing is
not strictly prohibited. The European Union (EU) was formed in 1950
in part as an effort to allow the countries that signed the Maastricht
Treaty (the Member States) to compete in the international market.
Creating a single market within the EU has been a gradual and diffi-
cult process. One of the main goals of EU legislation has been the har-
monization of laws and the creation of a single market so the EU can
compete at a global level comparable to the United States.2 9 In the
EU, the drive towards the single market outweighs the negative ef-
fects of parallel trade within the Community.3 °
As the result of the EU's push towards a single unified market,
Articles 30 to 36 ban all qualitative restrictions on trade between
Member States allowing for the free movement of goods and services in
the European Market.3 ' Article 30 also prohibits "all measures having
an equivalent effect" of a qualitative restriction.32 However, Article 36
made it clear that this does not threaten the protection of patents pro-
vided that the limitations were not actually arbitrary discrimination
or disguised restrictions on trade between Member States.3 3
To allow for the free movement of goods and services, EU law
tolerates parallel trade.3 4 In De Peijer, the European Court of Justice
interpreted Articles 30 through 36, establishing the legality of parallel
27 Singham, supra note 3, at 409 (citing National Economic Research Associates,
The Economic Consequences of the Choice of Regime in the Area of Trademarks,
(Feb. 8, 1999) Executive Summary at 6-7).
28 Id.
29 PRIME, supra note 2, at 88.
30 Singham, supra note 3, at 410.
31 Article 30-36, 2002 O.J. (C 325)
32 Id.
33 PmiE, supra note 2, at 5.
34 Joseph Darbra & Joan Rovira, Parallel Imports of Pharmaceuticals in the Euro-
pean Union, 14 PHARMAOOECONOMICS 129, 131-36 (1998).
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imports within the EU.3 The Court held that patients can import
cheaper medicines for their own use from a pharmacy in another mem-
ber state, provided that the product was available for sale in their own
country.36
As a result of the De Peijer ruling, the European Commission
created a guideline for national authorities within the EU. Parallel
imports are allowed if the importing countries verify that the medici-
nal imports are authorized within their borders and comply with the
EU guidelines.37 This creates price equalization across the European
Community, promoting a greater sense of one market across Europe.3 s
The EU justifies parallel importing with the doctrine of ex-
haustion of rights. In Centrafarm, a UK dealer imported goods from
Holland and sold them in the UK for less than the original patent
holder.39 The plaintiffs argued that this parallel import threatened
their profits and asserted their patent rights. However, the Court
ruled that the original dealer, by selling the product in the UK, ex-
hausted his patent rights for the entire EU. The court decided that
exercising patent rights to prevent parallel importation created an un-
reasonable interference on the free movement of goods as the profits
from the first market should recompense the patent owner
sufficiently.4 °
The EU also favors parallel importing because of socialized
medicine. In countries where the government pays for most of the
medical needs of the people, cheaper drugs result in lower cost for gov-
ernments.4 1 Thus, EU Member States prefer to reduce their national
medical costs by using parallel trade.42 However, the EU Council has
declared that parallel trade can only exist within the borders of the
European Community. 3 While the European Community opposes par-
allel trade involving a Member state and a non-member state, it allows
35 Case 104175, Offieve van Justice vs. de Peijer, E.C.R. 613, 1976 C.M.L.R. 271
(1976).
36 Id.
37 Commission Communication: Parallel Importation of Medicinal Products, May
6, 1982.
38 Dolmo, supra note 23, at 156. There are significant levels of pharmaceutical
parallel trade in four of the European States: Denmark, Germany, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom, with Sweden and Norway increasing their parallel
importing as well.
39 Case 15/74, Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug Inc., ECR 1147 (1974).
40 Id.
41 See Barfield, supra note 17.
42 See Barfield, supra note 17, at 199.
43 See id.
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parallel importing within the European Community to promote the
larger goal of one European market.4 4
When it comes to parallel imports, the EU views the harmoni-
zation of community laws as more important than intellectual prop-
erty rights.4" Outside of the European Community, the free movement
of goods and services no longer trump the intellectual property rights
of the patent holder, and, thus, parallel importing loses its privileged
status.4 6
While the EU considers its goal of market harmonization more
important than the intellectual property rights of the patent holder,
this has not affected the number of pharmaceutical companies that
settle within its borders. 47 Along with the United States and Japan,
the EU leads the world in pharmaceutical development.48 However,
this lax view towards the rights of pharmaceutical companies makes
the EU more likely to be in favor of parallel trading to alleviate the
global AIDS crisis.
V. PARALLEL TRADE IN THE UNITED STATES
The strong pharmaceutical drug lobby pressured the govern-
ment to forbid parallel trade in the United States. The United States
spends 2.8% of its gross domestic product on research and develop-
ment, as opposed to the 2% the rest of the developed world spends.4 9
Pioneering pharmaceutical firms spend approximately 20% of their to-
tal profit on research and development, or 30% of the total costs of the
company.5 0 Due to their prominence in the national market, the inter-
ests of the research/development pharmaceutical firms are strongly
protected by both the laws of the United States and the U.S. Trade
Representative in his dealings abroad.
Under United States patent law, patent owners have the right
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling or im-
porting a patented invention. 5 1 It is a priority of the lawmaker to en-
4See id.
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 This may be because Europeans have the money necessary to buy medicine and
along with the United States and Japan, make up 80% of the world drug market.
49 Singham, supra note 3, at 372.
50 Particia M. Danzon, The Economics of Parallel Trade, 13 PHARMAECONOMICS
301 (1998).
51 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1995).
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sure that adequate incentives for investment in the development of
new drugs exist.5 2
Restrictions on trade were not always viewed as positive, pro-
competitive measures. Until 1977, vertical trade restrictions, where a
company at one stage of production imposes a contractual limit on a
firm at another stage of production, were per se illegal. 53 However, in
the Sylvania case, the Supreme Court ruled that restrictions such as
vertical trade are widely used and have not proved to be harmful to
competition, and therefore should be analyzed under the rule of reason
to determine their legality. 4
The rule of reason analysis asks whether the challenged trade
limitation is likely to harm competition and take from the consumer
the advantages of a competitive system. Parallel trade clearly
passes the rule of reason. Parallel trade restricts others from import-
ing lower priced goods to the disadvantage of the patent holder, which
seems to damage the consumer in the short term, but benefits competi-
tion in the long term as the patent holder is not discouraged from cre-
ating new products. In this way, parallel trading escapes being
monopolistic, and, therefore, the Sherman Antitrust Act does not deem
it illegal.5"
The patent holder can impose and enforce territorial restric-
tions on sales in the United States. In 1994, Congress amended patent
law to strengthen the patent holder's rights against the parallel im-
porter. "[Whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the pat-
ent therefore, infringes the patent."57 The U.S. courts continue to sup-
port patent holders in international exhaustion claims by defendants
and ban parallel trade in pharmaceuticals.
United States policy firmly opposes pharmaceutical parallel
trading because of the large number of pioneer drug companies in the
United States. In the past, industries, such as the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, would go directly to the country in question to negotiate their
intellectual property rights, leaving the United States government out
52 See Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have
They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389 (1999). This is one of the main
thrusts of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
53 Sergio Baches Opi, The Approaches of the European Commission and the U.S.
Antirust Agencies Towards Exclusivity Clauses in Licensing Agreements, 24 B.C.
INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 85, 133 (2000).
54 Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977).
55 Opi, supra note 47, at 91.
56 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2005).
57 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
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of the negotiations. 5 8 However, as the economy became more interna-
tionalized, "firms saw government as a potential ally against foreign
companies." 9  The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) became a powerful lobbying group and had a signif-
icant influence over the United States' involvement in TRIPS.6 °
The U.S. Trade Representative, whose goal is to promote
American commercial business abroad, is an influential and tenacious
ally of the pharmaceutical company. For example, the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative used threats of trade sanctions to reduce the amount of
illegal generic production in at least seven other countries.6 1
However, the United States government appears to practice
parallel importing and compulsory licensing in other areas, such as in
pollution control devices, pesticides, and computer processing chips.6 2
This hypocrisy stems from the close relationship of the United States
to the drug companies, resulting in contradictory trade policy.6 3 In
most cases, the United States is a constant supporter of freer market
economies, but, in the case of pharmaceutical industries, the policy be-
comes the protection of the patent-holding companies at the expense of
competitive markets.
Because, by definition, parallel trading concerns at least two
countries, it is an international concern, and the laws of the United
States do not govern the way other countries act. This led to the
TRIPS conference of 1994 and the ensuing battle over whether parallel
trading would be allowed in the case of world medical crises.
VI. TRIPS, DOHA AND THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement
(TRIPS) is a minimum intellectual property rights agreement; it en-
compasses both developed and developing countries, so its rules are
more flexible than those of countries with strong patent protection.
58 Susan K. Sell, Proceedings of the 2002 Conference Access to Medicines in the
Developing World: International Facilitation or Hindrance?: Panel #2: TRIPS and
Access to Medicines: TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 481, 484-85 (2002).
59 Id. at 485.
60 For more evidence of PhRMA's influence over the U.S. Trade Representative,
see Sell, supra note 52, at 494 (explaining the Argentinean patent problem);
Weissman, supra note 6, at1075-78 (discussing political maneuvering).
61 Blood and Gore, supra note 21, at 16. ("The Office of the USTR... has become a
virtual appendage of the drug industry.").
62 Dolmo, supra note 23, at 144.
63 Id. at 152.
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A. Why Developing Countries Approve Parallel Trade
Parallel trade in the context of developing nations is both a hu-
manitarian and economic concern. In developed nations, parallel im-
ports enable other distributors to undercut the patent holder's price
and outsell him in the market. In developing nations, parallel trade
allows the population to get the medication it needs.
While patent rights are essential for the developed country, a
developing country must weigh the rights of the patent holder with the
public health and find the rights of the patent holder wanting. In
Thailand and South Africa, the governments believe that the AIDS cri-
sis prevails over patent rights. A developing nation can override a
drug company's patent rights by obtaining a compulsory license under
the 1994 TRIPS agreement.
When a state grants a compulsory license, the grantee obtains
the right to produce the patented medication without the permission of
the patent holder.6 4 Once the state issues a compulsory license, it can
produce a generic drug providing the consumer a more affordable
price.6 5 The government then repays the patent holder what it be-
lieves is reasonable compensation.6 6 These generic drugs must be
used in the domestic market and cannot be exported to other markets.
Compulsory licensing hinders to the market in developed com-
panies. If the government ignored the patent rights of one company in
favor of another, it would end innovation in the country. However, in
developing countries, compulsory licensing may be the only way that
medicines critical to people's survival get to the poorest citizens. Thus,
in developing countries, it does not help the populace to have a strong
intellectual property regime.
Compulsory licensing is primarily a humanitarian concept.
The legislature's hope is that the compulsory license will result in an
increase of life-saving medicines within his country.6 7 However, the
drug companies oppose such legislation because it leads to the dilution
of intellectual property rights in developing countries and does not al-
low the innovator to be properly compensated for his drug.
Pharmaceuticals are afraid that the developing countries will begin to
see obtaining drugs through a compulsory license as the norm as op-
posed to an exception in the case of crisis.6 8
64 Sell, supra note 52, at 500.
65 Id.
66 Divya Murthy, Note, The Future of Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 17 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1299, 1307 (2002).
67 Sara M. Ford, Note, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS Agree-
ment: Balancing Pills and Patients, 15 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 966 (2000).
68 Id.
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B. How
Article 31 of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) agreement allows compulsory licensing.6 9 There are
five criteria for a compulsory license: (1) the licensee must have ap-
plied to the patent-holder for authorization, (2) but did not obtain it;
(3) the license cannot be exclusive to one company; (4) the use of the
license is limited to the original purpose and (5) during the time when
such circumstances still exist; and the patent-holder receives proper
compensation from the drug sales. o Article 31 requires the country be
in the grip of a "national emergency" that the patented drug can allevi-
ate.7 On the surface, compulsory licensing seems like a good way to
alleviate crushing health crises in developing countries. However,
often the countries do not have the production infrastructure to imple-
ment the compulsory license they have been granted; they are unable
to exercise the compulsory license not because of right, but because of
ability.
Section F of Article 31 requires production of the compulsorily
licensed drug to occur mainly in the domestic market of the licensing
country.7 2 The architects of TRIPS intended to block any country with
a compulsory license from exporting the drugs to countries where the
patent is protected with this section.7 3 However, Section F has the
indirect effect of preventing countries unable to make the generics
from importing them from another country with the compulsory li-
cense. As a result, Section F blocked the poorest of developing nations
from getting the medications they needed.
The WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001
did not address parallel trade in pharmaceuticals for developing coun-
tries."4 The WTO recognized this, and in their ministerial, urged the
TRIPS Council to find a solution and "report back to the General
69 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81, 93
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
70 Id.
71 See WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, Nov. 20, 2001, 5, available at http://www.wto.org/ english/
thewtoe/ministe/min0le/ mindecl trips.e.htm (last visited May 27, 2005)
[hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration]. Paragraph 5 provides a description of
a national emergency: health crises such as AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
diseases likely to spread broadly.72 Press Release, World Trade Organization, Decision Removes Final Patent Ob-
stacle to Cheap Drug Imports (Aug. 30, 2003), available at http://docson-
line.wto.org [hereinafter Final Patent Obstacle].73 Id.
74 Final Patent Obstacle, supra note 72.
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Council before the end of 2002.''75 Due to a deadlock between the
members, the Council missed this original December 31st deadline.
The United States and EU took opposite sides in this debate.
While the United States signed the TRIPS agreement, it claimed coun-
tries taking advantage of compulsory licensing under TRIPS in fact
violated TRIPS. The EU was much more willing to allow parallel
trade in the context of the developing world's AIDS crisis.
In December of 1997, three years after the TRIPS agreement,
President Nelson Mandela of South Africa signed into law an act
which allowed the Minister of Health to revoke the patents and issue
compulsory licenses for several drugs that staved off the symptoms of
HIV/AIDS.76 National Institutes of Health created several of the
drugs that South Africa marked for compulsory licensing, including
AZT, DDI, and DDC. The NIH gave those patent rights to the phar-
maceutical companies that manufactured them. The act also allowed
for parallel importing so countries could take advantage of the discrim-
inatory pricing policies and import the cheapest drugs. 7
The United States tried to stop both Thailand and South Africa
from using compulsory licensing. PhRMA challenged the South Afri-
can Medicines Act in South Africa's high court with the full support of
the Patent and Trademark Office, then-Vice President Gore, the U.S.
Trade Representative and others.7" The U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) also threatened Thailand with sanctions on their core imports
if they did not stop plans to produce the generic version of the AIDS
drug DDI.v9
The press became involved, and equated supporting strong pat-
ent regimes with preventing HIV/AIDS sufferers from getting critical
medications."0 The media portrayed PhRMA's suit against South Af-
rica and the USTR's Thai sanctions as favoring patents over lives.
Journalists pointed out that compulsory licensing under TRIPS "was
75 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 65. The parallel trade problem is
often referred to as the "Paragraph 6" issue as it appears in paragraph six of the
document.
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intended as a lifeline. But, in practice, any country reaching for this
lifeline has been handcuffed by United States trade negotiators.""1
The United States position against compulsory licensing was
further undermined by the Health and Human Services' reaction to
the anthrax scare. s2 U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services
threatened Bayer, the producers of Cipro, that the United States
would issue a compulsory license unless Bayer reduced its price for the
government.8 3 This move garnered many critics, who pointed out that
anthrax caused less than a dozen deaths, while AIDS is cutting a wide
swath through the populations of both Thailand and South Africa. In
1999, PhRMA and the U.S. Trade Representative dropped their suit
against South Africa under pressure from international rights groups
and the press.8 4
Despite this relaxed position on compulsory licenses, the
United States was still reluctant to allow parallel trading in humani-
tarian cases. As stated before, compulsory licensing is not an option
for countries without the infrastructure to create the generic drugs. In
the case of these developing nations, parallel trading is the only way
they can obtain the drugs necessary to alleviate their medical crises.
But parallel trade was still prevented by Article 31(f).5 Since the par-
agraph six problem was the only intellectual property issue still unde-
cided after the Doha Ministerial Conference, it was necessary to find a
compromise that all members of the WTO would agree to.
The EU was more open to parallel trade as a solution to the
paragraph six problem and accepted the original proposal.8 6 After the
WTO missed the 2002 deadline, the EU proposed a tiered pricing sys-
tem for AIDS drugs similar to that used already for vaccines and con-
traceptives.8 7 Under this system, the drug producing companies
submitted their bids to international agencies who handle the costs
and burden of distribution. While the drugs sell at a fraction of their
cost in developed countries, drug companies still make a small profit.
This system allows poorer countries to ignore barriers on parallel
trade and focus on their health problems.
The United States rejected this proposal. In a letter to the Eu-
ropean trade representative, the U.S. Trade Representative Robert
81 Id.
82 Murthy, supra note 60, at 1314-15.
83 Id.
84 Dolmo, supra note 23, at 138.
85 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 63.
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TMEs, Aug. 30, 2003, at A14.
87 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. at Odds With Europe Over Rules on World Drug
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Zoellick claimed that a tiered pricing system would erode patent pro-
tections.8 8 He reasoned that while there are only a few drugs that
treat AIDS, the diseases that affect those with AIDS are numerous:
malaria, tuberculosis, pneumonia, meningitis, fungal infections, and
cancer.8 9 The Bush administration and the pharmaceutical industry
believe that if they discount AIDS drugs, Africa would begin to ask for
discounts on drugs treating these secondary diseases. The domino ef-
fect would create compulsory licenses for many major drugs and the
drug companies would lose much of their revenue.
Zoellick also asserted that the lack of cheap AIDS drugs in Af-
rica is a function of the "enormous infrastructure problems plaguing
this region, rather than drug prices."90 Zoellick believed the drug com-
panies should be trusted to provide their products at the lowest possi-
ble price. He also opposed any system proposed by the EU that
regulates world drug prices or creates a database to track varying drug
cost in different markets.9 1 This resistance lead Doctors Without Bor-
ders drug price specialist Ellen t'Hoen to claim the European Union
does not want the $10 billion dollar fund to "turn into a subsidy for Big
Pharma, and the United States is saying the reverse."92
On August 30, 2003, the WTO developed a compromise that
suited all members, and allowed for parallel trade to nations in medi-
cal crises.93 Those countries may obtain a compulsory license to a pat-
ented drug; they cannot produce it, but may import it from another"eligible importing Member" that has a compulsory license to the
drug.94 The importing Member must take "reasonable measures" to
make sure the drug imported into the country is not re-exported to
another country.95
In an effort to confine the parallel licensing only to the most
needy countries, the United States convinced several countries not to
take advantage of the parallel licensing provision. Those countries-
China, Korea, Israel, Kuwait, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Turkey and
the United Arab Emirates-announced separately that they would
only use the system in "situations of national emergency or other cir-
88 Id.
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at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/implem-para6e.htm (last visited
May 27, 2005).
94 Id.
95 Id.
20061
92 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 6:1
cumstances of extreme urgency."96 The Bush administration also
stated it wanted the measure restricted to a certain number of dis-
eases to prevent the domino effect with other compulsory licenses, but
no such stipulation was made in the compromise.9 7
Throughout the WTO negotiations, the United States main-
tained its anti-patent weakening position, forcing the rest of the WTO
to adjust their policies to reflect this stance. 98 The EU proves itself
more open to measures that would potentially damage the pharmaceu-
tical industry, such as the pricing database, tiered pricing systems,
and parallel trading for compulsorily licensed drugs.
In countries where the general population cannot afford the
medication they need, parallel trade may benefit the patent holder.
Often the sick in developing countries are priced out of buying medica-
tion altogether; the average yearly wage of South Africans barely cov-
ers the costs of buying AIDS medication for that year. Since Africa
accounts for only 1.6% of the global market for pharmaceuticals, it
seems unlikely that parallel trading in South Africa is affecting the
ability of the pharmaceutical companies to conduct R&D.9 9 Although
the drug companies feared a domino effect of compulsory licensing,
such a situation has not yet occurred, nor is it likely to constitute a"national emergency" under the August 30th compromise. 10 0
VI. CONCLUSION
During the last decade, the United States has acted as the
agent of the pharmaceutical companies, protecting their patent rights
and drug profits above public health concerns. This position garnered
much criticism from the world at large. While the United States
agreed to the August 30, 2003 declaration about parallel trade, the
declaration is not legally binding.' 0 ' Perhaps the United States will
adopt the same policy toward parallel trading that they had towards
compulsory licensing after TRIPS. However, the criticism of the world
at large and the press may stop any attempts to prevent the develop-
ing world's access to AIDS medications.
Europe is much more open to the concept of parallel trade as a
panacea for the medication crises in the developing world. Less wed-
96 Press Release, World Trade Organization, Decision Removes Final Patent Ob-
stacle to Cheap Drug Imports (Aug. 30, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news-e/pres03-e/pr350_e.htm (last visited May 27, 2005).
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ded to the concerns of the pharmaceutical companies, the EU is
quicker to place the health concerns of the developing world over the
intellectual property rights of the drug patent holder. This seems to be
the WTO's vision as well. Pascal Lamy, the European Trade Repre-
sentative who negotiated with Robert Zoellick during the 2002 dead-
lock, recently became that organization's fifth Director-General. The
economic results of the 2003 compromise will most likely determine
how the WTO acts in future.
